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This paper will explore the effect that a very new piece of consumer 
legislation will have on the field of insurance law. Though very little has been 
written on the Consumer Guarantees Act 1993, and even less on the Act's 
impact on insurance law, this paper will articulate what the author believes to 
be some of the key elements in the Act and examine their likely effect, if any, 
on the insurance relationship. 
It is suggested that the Act alone, as a weapon for insureds against errant 
insurance service providers, may well prove inadequate. Indeed the Act may 
add very little to what the insured already possesses in the way of remedies. 
Nevertheless, the Act does take general common law principles of post-
contractual service law and engrosses them it into a statutory form. 
The paper will start by looking at the rationale for putting into place such a 
general statutory regime. Consideration will also be given to the impact, if any 
that the CGA might have on the duty of utmost good faith and on the 
interpretation of insurance contracts. 
The features of the guarantees will be discussed. It must be remembered as 
the paper touches on each guarantee that , at least in respect of consumers, 
as defined in the Act, the guarantees are cannot be contracted out of. This 
might be the most important provision as far as consumer protection is 
concerned. 
Privity aspects and the abilities of third parties to rely on the Act will be 
examined. As a consumer protection measure a wide definition of "consumer" 
ought to ensure a responsible attitude from service providers. However, the 
problems with a wider class of potential plaintiffs is evident. 
The possibility of contributory negligence as a defence for service providers will 
be considered as will the extent to which service providers might have to 
guarantee results and bow to the expectations of insureds. 
The text of this paper (excluding contents page, footnotes, bibliography and 
annexures) comprises approximately 12,270 words. 
A customer is the most important person on our premises. 
He is not dependent on us; we are dependent on him. 
He is not an interruption to our work; he is the purpose of our work., 
He is not an outsider to our business; he is an essential part of it. 
We are not doing him a favour by serving him. 
He is doing us a favour by allowing us to serve him. 
Mahatma Gandhi 
1 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Consumer Guarantees Act 19931 has been part of New Zealand law for 
over a year now.2 In an attempt to clarify the rights of consumers in relation to 
services, the Act establishes a set of statutory guarantees which are to be 
implied in all contracts for the supply of consumer goods and services. It then 
equips consumers with rights of redress where any guarantee is not met. 
The Act contains a number of innovations. The most significant of these are 
those that it applies to services. Up until 1 April 1994 only goods had been 
subject to legislation. 3 
This paper will present an examination of the potential impact that the CGA 
may have on insurance law. While the CGA might be heralded as a new 
weapon in the consumers' armoury, the practical effect of the Act by itself 
within the field of insurance law may be minimal. 
Problems exist in that the insurance contracts by their very nature can be 
long term and produce no tangible result. Problems may not manifest for 
some time. Added to this is that the battle between the individual or the small 
corporation and the insurer is inescapably an unequal one. The insurer is 
well funded , well lawyered and sometimes well able to ruin the insured who, 
faced with a loss, may not be in a financial condition to add to its burdens the 
risks and costs of litigation. 
On their own, the provisions of the CGA might be a "toothless tiger". But 
taken in conjunction with causes of action based on contract, tort , statute and 
1 Hereinafter "the Act" or "the CGA". 
2 The Consumer Guarantees Act 1993 came into force on 1 April 1994. 
3 For example the Sales of Goods Act 1908 and the Hire Purchase Act 1971 . 
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an underlying duty of the utmost good faith , the guarantees in the CGA may 
provide worthwhile. Certainly from a lay person's perspective the guarantees, 
if properly publicised, represent a starting point in the balancing of bargaining 
power between insured and insured. 
11 CONSUMER GUARANTEES ACT 1993 
A Rationale for services to be governed by the CGA 
Service providers at all levels of the insurance relationship would do well to 
consider the words of Mahatma Gandhi quoted at the start of this paper. 
Customers are the basis of their business. However, the nature of the 
insurance relationship at a consumer level as a very much "take it or leave it" 
transaction put insurance companies in a position of strength. Despite 
competition, insurance contracts seldom differ and insurers can virtually 
dictate terms to insureds on standard form contracts. 4 
Up until recently service providers, unlike sellers of goods, had little apart 
from the common law to set out standards for service. Post-sale consumer 
protection has historically tended to limit coverage to the sale of consumer 
goods and not include consumer services. However, since consumers lack 
the ability to protect themselves in equal measure whether the transaction 
involves goods or services, it is difficult to understand the failure of existing 
legislation to include at least some kinds of services under the post-sale 
protective umbrella. 5 
B Tangible and Intangible Services 
A possible explanation for the exclusion of services from most consumer-
protection legislation is that services, such as insurance services, that have 
4 The reasons for standard term contracts often lie in administrative efficiency and commercial 
expediency since the insurer will be contracting with thousands of insureds. 
5 OH Vernon An Outline for Post-Sale Consumer Legislation in New Zealand (Iowa City, 1 July 
1987)14. 
no tangible or physical result require very different statutory treatment than 
consumer transactions in goods and services that yield a tangible result. It is 
difficult to think in terms of intangible services being repaired, have an 
ordinary useful life, or requiring spare parts. 6 
4 
Further, the repair and replacement remedies, the norm when suppliers 
default in the sale of consumer goods and services with tangible results, have 
no applicability to services that lack a tangible result. 7 
Consumer services that yield a tangible or physical result fit rather well within 
the CGA. Services such as car repairs, building, plumbing, dental services all 
seek to achieve a specified result. They produce tangible products or achieve 
some obvious effect. It is easy to identify whether a task that a service 
provider has been contracted to perform has been carried out with 
reasonable skill and care. Similarly one can easily identify whether the price 
charged was, in the absence of contract, reasonable and whether the service 
achieves a particular result in a reasonable time. Most problems in respect of 
tangible services can be resolved under the CGA without the interposition of 
legal counsel. 8 
The reverse is true for problems likely to stem from breaches by suppliers of 
services that have no tangible or physical end result. The problems raised 
when an insurance company fails to perform as promised often are 
substantially more complex than the problems for which consumer legislation 
is designed. They can encompass long-tail liabilities and can involve 
significant magnitude of loss. They tend to require legal counsel, and 
6 Above n5, 15. 
7 This problem is discussed below. 
8 It is envisaged that most grievances that arise under the CGA will be resolved by the parties 
negotiating or through the Disputes Tribunal. 
possibly either very specialised hearing procedures or a full-scale judicial 
proceedings for their resolution.9 
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With few exceptions, regulation of suppliers of services New Zealand has 
historically focused on licensing and technical qualifications rather than 
directly on the quality of service rendered. The absence of detailed protective 
legislation created a gap that the CGA was intended to fill. Whether the Act 
does so in respect of insurance services is debatable. 
Banks, lawyers and insurance companies tend to require specialised 
legislation rather than general legislation such as the CGA. Nevertheless the 
Act is drafted to capture all such services .While it seems clear that 
consumers need legislative protection in their dealing with the supplier of 
services that have no physical end product, the post-sale consumer statute 
seems the wrong place for it. Specialised statutory treatment for insurance 
services may be the desirable alternative. 
C Australia's Example 
The Australian Trade Practices Act 197 4 was used as something of a 
template for the service guarantees in the CGA. 
However, the CGA definition of "service" explicitly includes services provided 
by a supplier under a contract of insurance.10 Section 7 4 of the Australian Act 
specifically excludes insurance services from the warranty as to reasonable 
care and skill. This omission could be explained on the basis that Australia 
has enacted a general law to govern insurance. 
9 Above n 5, 15. 
10 Section 2(1) "Service" (b) . 
The Insurance Contracts Act 1984 (Cth) was passed following 
recommendations of the Australian Law Reform Commission in its report, 
"Insurance Contracts".11 The law made substantial changes to the law 
relating to insurance contracts. 
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Unlike Australia, New Zealand is still principally governed by the common 
law. Statutory change appears in the form of the Insurance Law Reform Act 
1977 relating, among other things, to misrepresentation and non-disclosure 
and the Insurance Law Reform Act 1985 relating, among other things, to 
insurable interest. 
A more recent development is the Insurance Intermediaries Act 1994 relating 
to the obligations of intermediaries with respect to the handling of customer's 
monies. 
New Zealand could be accused of tinkering with aspects of insurance law that 
need to be addressed in a comprehensive review. Given that the nature of 
the insurance contract is based on the principle of utmost good faith , a case 
exists for such special treatment of the area. Th is would represent a step 
towards the Trans-Tasman harmony that the CGA has started to move 
towards. 
D An Additional Sword for /nsureds? 
Contracts of insurance, unlike most other classes of contract, are based on 
the principle that each party to the contract must act with the utmost good 
faith in their dealings with the other. In addition to disclosure and 
representation obligations, the duty of utmost good fa ith clearly extends to 
the admin istration and management of the contract. 
11 Australian Law Reform Commission Report No 20 1982. 
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1 The Doctrine of utmost good faith. 
The common law duty of utmost good faith is not an implied term of the 
contract of insurance nor does it arise by way of a collateral contract. 12 An 
insured can recover damages from an insurer in respect of loss suffered by 
the insured as a result of the insurer's breach of duty. However, this has been 
restricted. In the House of Lords Banque Financiere de la Cite SA (formerly 
BKU) v Skandia13 Lord Templeman said that a breach of the duty of utmost 
good faith does not sound in damages. "The only remedy open to the insured 
is to rescind the policy and recover the premium."14 
The avoidance of the contract is usually an ineffective remedy in the case of 
a misrepresentation or non-disclosure by the service provider. It will therefore 
be better to rely on the CGA or for the action to sound in contract or tort. 
2 Common Law and Statute 
Within the law of obligations, a consumer insured can rely on breaches of 
contract and tort law as the basis of their cause of action.15 
Statutory protection also exists in the form of the Insurance Law Reform Acts 
1977 and 1985 as well as section 9 of the Fair Trading Act 1986. 
12 Banque Keyser Ullman v Skandia (UK) Insurance Co Ltd (1987) 4 ANZ Insurance Cases 60-
759. 
13 (1990) 6 ANZ Insurance Cases 60-987. 
14 K Sutton (ed) Australia and New Zealand Insurance Reporter (CCH, Sydney, 1994) 1-600. 
15 The Ontario Court of Appeal in Fine's Flowers Ltd v General Accident Assurance Co (1989) 
81 DLR 139 suggested that an agent's liability to act with care may be founded in equity. However, 
AA Tarr and JA Kennedy Insurance Law in New Zealand (2ed , Law Book Co, Sydney, 1992) 105 
disagree and believe that equity should relate more to allegations of dishonesty. 
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Now a lay person without a knowledge of insurance law principles can simply 
rely on some of the broadly applicable consumer guarantees enshrined in the 
CGA to implement their rights. 
Proponents of the Act claimed the CGA took significant court decisions and 
codified existing rights in respect of goods, spelling them out clearly, setting 
out extra rights in connection with services, and setting out a clear message 
so that people can pick it up and read and understand it easily.16 
Whether the Act will provide consumer insureds with a mechanism with which 
to seek effective redress is a matter for time and academic debate. 
Notwithstanding alternative dispute mechanisms and the moves towards 
industry self-regulation and codes of practice 17, it is worthwhile considering 
the potential application of the Act in insurance law 
3 Effect on Interpretation and construction of insurance contracts. 
It will clearly be the case at a consumer level that there ought to be a 
reorientation in the interpretation and construction of contracts of insurance. 
Historically, policy wordings have developed in an evolutionary way through 
decades of case law. Insurance companies have years of legal experience 
litigating the terms of their contracts. Skilled lawyers have written these 
contracts which have been carefully upgraded as new decisions are handed 
down by the courts. New case law is incorporated into pol icies and contracts 
are regularly re-written . Terms that may appear to a consumer to be simple 
16NZPD, vol 522, 6904, 17 March 1992 per Warren Kyd . 
17 The Life Office Association of New Zealand Code of Business Practices for Insurance 
Companies, the Insurance Council of New Zealand Fair Insurance Code and Insurance and 
Investment Advisers Association Code of Professional Ethics are three examples of self-regulation . 
Further efforts are manifest by the implementation of the Insurance and Savings Ombudsman 
Scheme. 
English may have their origin in a legal opinion and may have been given a 
special interpretation. Because companies make it their business to know 
how standard terms have been defined by judges, insurers have the upper 
hand in drafting policies and selecting the language they find most 
advantageous for making a profit. 18 
However, some people within the insurance industry believe that "plain 
english" wordings that have not been tested in an evolutionary way through 
decades of case law will be subject to a "cold turkey" introduction to legal 
testing. 19 In a sense, the wordings themselves are already playing less 
importance. They are giving way to what is fair to the consumer. Increasingly 
forums are not just looking at legal liability, but at moral obligations as well, 
regardless of contractual terms. Indeed the provisions of the CGA may be 
changing an insurance contract from being solely a written document to an 
amalgam of both oral and written understandings. 
As long ago as 1912 Lord Shaw of Dunfermline in the Privy Council 
said 
if an answer is obtained to such a question [framed by the insurer] 
which is upon a fair construction a true answer, it is not open to the 
insuring company to maintain that the question was put in a sense 
different from or more comprehensive than the proponent's answer 
covered. Where an ambiguity exists, the contract must stand if an 
answer has been made to the question on a fair and reasonable 
construction of the question. Otherwise the ambiguity would be a trap 
9 
18 R Alexander "When an Insurance Company Breaches Its Contract A Brief Summary of the 
General Law in the United States" The Consumer Law Page The Alexander Law Firm. Internet 
email talf@netcom .com 
19 AHM Adams in a paper to the "Insurance Law: Focus on Options" Conference of New 
Zealand Insurance Association 28 Octoner 1994. 
against which the insured would be protected by the courts of law. 20 
Interpretation of insurance contracts in favour of insureds even in the 
absence of ambiguity might become a matter of course. 
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We are still some way off from judging whether the CGA will evolve as an 
interpretation mechanism. Nevertheless, if insurers are aware of the Act's 
provisions and colour their conduct based on the perceived repercussions of 
failing to adhere to the guarantees, the Act will have gone some way towards 
being a success. 
Ill OUTLINE OF THE CONSUMER GUARANTEES ACT 1993. 
A Overview 
There are a number provisions in the CGA which service providers, including 
those within the insurance industry, will have to be mindful of. Four of them 
are statutory guarantees which imply a quality standard into each contract for 
the supply of services. A further provision imposes harsh penalties for service 
providers who attempt to contract out of their obligations under the Act. 
Suppliers guarantee that the service will be carried out with care and skill. 21 
Also guaranteed is that the service is reasonably fit for any purpose, and of 
such nature and quality that it can reasonably be expected to achieve any 
particular result, either of which the consumer has made known to the 
supplier before or at the time of making the contract for the supply of the 
service.22 
20 Condogianis v Guardian Assurance Co Ltd [1921] 2 AC 125. See also Norwich Union Fire 
Insurance Society Ltd v Traynor [1972] 2 NZLR 504, 509. 
21 Section 28. 
22 Section 29. 
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There is a guarantee that the service will be completed within a reasonable 
time23 and that a reasonable price will be charged for the service, unless the 
price is fixed by the contract. 24 
The consumer is given a range of possible remedies for breach of any 
guarantee. 25 The adequacy or otherwise of those remedies in the insurance 
context will be discussed below. 
Contracting out of the provisions of the Act is expressly prohibited unless the 
consumer is acquiring the services for the purpose of a business and 
provided the agreement for those services is in writing .26 
In the absence of this exception, every supplier of services who attempts to 
contract out of any of the provisions commits an offence against s13(i) of the 
Fair Trading Act 1986. This prohibits making a "false or misleading 
representation concerning the existence, exclusion, or effect of any condition, 
warranty, guarantee, right or remedy." 
23 Section 30. 
24 Section 31. 
25 Section 32; giving the supplier the right to remedy the failure and the consumer's right to have 
the failure remedied elsewhere, to cancel the contract or obtain damages for any reduction in value 
of the product of a service and consequential loss. 
26 Section 43. 
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B Coverage of the Consumer Guarantees Act 1993 
1 What is a "service"? 
The definition of "service" includes any rights, benefits, privileges, or 
facilities that are or are to be provided, granted, or conferred by a supplier 
under a contract of insurance, including life assurance and life reassurance.27 
Contracts of or relating to insurance, including life assurance and life 
reassurance, are specifically included in the definition of service in the Act. 28 
Insurance brokerage services fall within the general definition of "services".29 
Services can be broken up into categories which include advice, policy 
implementation, servicing, the actual insurance cover as well as claims 
handling. The broad definition covers conventional liability and contingency 
products as well as life insurance savings products 
To be covered by the Act the contract of insurance must be ord inarily 
acquired for "personal , domestic or household use or consumption". 30 
The following may be within that scope: 
• household insurance; 
• motor vehicle insurance; 
• life assurance; 
27 Section 2(1) "Service" (b) . The provision of services to procure the issue of a contract of 
insurance from a third party insurer is antecedent to the issue of a contract of insurance and is not 
a service under contract of insurance. Zoneffv Eleam Credit Union Limited (1990) ATPR 41 -00, 
51 ,160. 
28 Section 2(1) of the CGA. Contracts of insurance are specifically excluded from the Trade 
Practices Act 1974(section 74) ; the Australian equivalent of the CGA. However the Australian 
Courts have been keen to confine the exclusion: see Wamack v ANZ Banking Group (1989) 5 ANZ 
Insurance cases 60-897. 
29 For the purposes of this paper services provided by insurers and their agent will be 
referred to as "insurance services". 
30 Section 2(1) - definition of "consumer". 
13 
• income protection and disability insurance; 31 
• Medical insurance; 
• Travel insurance. 
2 Who is a supplier? 
For the purposes of the CGA, a supplier is, inter alia, a person who in trade, 
supplies services to a consumer. This definition will encompass insurers and 
all types of insurance intermediaries. The particular nature of the 
intermediary32 will affect the way that the CGA operates. 
Insurance intermediaries are either agents or employees of insurers, or 
independent persons who act on behalf of insureds. 
(a) Agents of the Insurer 
Intermediaries in the broad sense include such personnel as insurance 
company management, inspectors, office staff; underwriters and damage 
assessors. Where the insurer is the principal , the term "agent" may apply to a 
number of different categories of person. The most common are 
• full-time employees, 33 
• full-time employees who are paid partly by salary and 
partly by commission, and 
• persons who are not employed by the insurer but who 
are restricted by contract with the insurer as to the nature 
of the work that may be performed for other insurers. 34 
31 It is debatable whether this is ordinarily acquired in a business contract. M Ewan and C Grice 
Consumer Guarantees Act (New Zealand Law Society Seminar, March 1994) 71 . 
32 For example tied agent, broker, financial planner, professional adviser, even a solicitor or 
accountant. 
33 For example, customer service personnel; claims clerks. underwriters, 
34 That is, "tied agents" with little or no ability to accept business for other insurers. 
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To this end, the legal concept of agent includes an employee of the insurer to 
the extent that the actions of the agent are considered to be the acts of the 
insurer. 
Where the intermediary is a tied agent or a salaried employee, they are at all 
times the agent of the Insurer. Accordingly, whether they are giving financial 
advice or facilitating the sale of a specific product, they will be deemed to be 
"the Insurer" and the Insurer will be liable for their actions under the CGA. 
The insurer will vicariously be liable for the actions of its agents. 
(b) Agents of the Insured 
Agents of the insurer can be contrasted with agents of the insured. For the 
most part, this will encompass insurance brokers whose principal will be their 
client insured. 
A broker is a wholly independent intermediary appointed by the insured to 
obtain insurance, and thereafter to assist with the operation of the policy, 
including the making of claims. Where the intermediary can demonstrate 
some degree of "independence" from the insurer, they are unlikely to bind the 
insurer in respect of advice given. This is more likely to be the case where 
consumers purchase financial advice from the intermediary for a fee, as a 
discreet transaction. 
In such a case, the broker will be liable to the insured, independently of the 
insurer. 
The broker and the insurance company are suppliers of a service to the 
principal, the consumer, in terms of the CGA. The obligations placed on the 
15 
agent by the CGA therefore augment those owed to the consumer and are in 
addition to those arising directly from the contract of agency. 
Case law abounds surrounding the distinction between brokers and agents 
and whether a particular intermediary acts for the insurer or the insured. For 
the purposes of the CGA, as far as the intermediary's relations with the 
insured are concerned, it matters little into which of the categories the 
intermediary falls. All fall within the description of one who supplies services 
to a consumer. 
(c) The Insurance Intermediaries Act 1994 
In respect of specific product sales, the intermediary will be deemed to be an 
agent of the Insurer at the point of sale for the purposes of the Insurance 
Intermediaries Act 1994. The Insurance Intermediaries Act seeks to make 
clear the obligations of all intermediaries with respect to the handling of 
customer monies. 
Prior to 1994 the law relating to insurance intermediaries, and particularly 
brokers, had been uncertain. Particular problems had arisen where 
customers had given premiums to brokers and the broker had become 
insolvent35 or absconded before the money was passed to the insurer. In the 
specific situations concerned, the broker was found to be the agent of the 
insured and not the insurer. The insured therefore suffered a financial loss 
by being unable to obtain refunds from the insurer. 
For the purposes of the Insurance Intermediaries Act, all intermediaries 
appointed under a signed agreement are deemed to be the agent of the 
insurer for the purposes of receiving money due to the insurer from the 
insured, or due to the insured from the insurer. 
35 Norwich Winterthur Insurance (Aust) Udv Con-stan Industries of Australia Pty Ltd (1986) 160 
CLR 226. 
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To ensure congruity between the CGA and the Insurance Intermediaries Act, 
both of which are essentially consumer statutes, the Insurer ought to be liable 
under the CGA in respect of product sales made by these intermediaries. 
This situation would apply to life insurance brokers, registered financial 
planners and other single premium intermediaries such as lawyers, 
accountants and the like. 
3 Who is a "consumer"? 
The Act defines a "consumer" as a person who "acquires from a supplier 
goods or services of a kind ordinarily acquired for personal, domestic, or 
household use or consumption." 
This will obviously cover the proposer under the policy as the person who 
makes the contract with the insurer or who engages the services of an 
intermediary to arrange the insurance. The case is not so clear where others 
are to benefit from the policy. The provisions of the CGA might extend to 
cover third parties and named beneficiaries under the policy who, under the 
strict doctrine of privity of contract, would not have standing to bring an 
action. 
In section 2 of the Act the word "acquires" in relation to services includes 
"accept". A third party under a policy might be able to claim that they accept 
the rights, benefits, privileges, or facilities that are or are to be provided, 
granted, or conferred by a supplier under a contract of insurance, including 
life assurance and life reassurance. 
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IV PRIVITY ISSUES 
A Overview 
Given the CGA's consumer underpinning, the guarantees given under the Act 
could apply broadly to include the situation where a person receives the 
"benefit" of the service, even though there is no privity with the service 
provider. 36 
Beneficiaries can recover damages for negligence and breach of contract 
notwithstanding the fact that there is no contractual nexus between them. 
Indeed the doctrine of privity is not sacred and circumventing the doctrine is 
nothing new. 
Aside from the potential use of the Contracts (Privity) Act 1982, third parties 
can maintain an action based on 
• the construction of the insurance contract, 37 
• assignment of the benefit of life insurance, 38 
• insuring property as a trustee,39 
• section 9 of the Law Reform Act 1936, 
• section 83 of the Fire Prevention (Metropolis) Act 177 440 
and 
• the erosion of the requirement of insurable interest in the 
section 7 of the Insurance Law Reform Act 1985. 
36 A Fraser "The Liability of Service Providers Under The Consumer Guarantees Act 1993" 
[1994] 16 NZULR 23, 27. 
37 For example, the words of the contract expressly confer rights or benefits on a beneficiary. 
38 For example, assigning the death benefits to a mortgagee. 
39 If a trustee has the benefit of the CGA obligations, the trustee might be bound and entitled to 
enforce these for the benefit of the cestuis que trust. 
40 A person interested in a building that was damaged or destroyed by fire can give notice to the 
insurer requiring the insurer to apply the insurance monies towards rebuilding , reinstating or 
repairing the building. 
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In addition, a third party can rely on the tort of negligence and trust analyses 
to get around privity problems. 
Does this therefore allow a beneficiary under a life insurance contract to not 
only enforce the terms of the contract under which they receive a benefit but 
also to cancel the contract to which they are not a party? Does it also allow 
third parties who are not named under the policy but only designated to 
interfere in the conduct or otherwise of the insurance? 
If this were the case it would be strange that a third party might have a 
stronger claim under the CGA than that which exists at common law where 
an insurer would be within their rights to ignore a third party claim. 
Under a wide definition of "consumer", the agent could potentially be liable to 
many parties other than the principal. 
The danger in this, from an insurer's perspective, is that a wide and generous 
interpretation of the term "consumer" could potentially see the insurer liable 
to a number of different claimants who were not party to the original contract. 
Arguably, liability could not logically be restricted to cases where a specific 
named beneficiary was disappointed, but would inevitably have to be 
extended to cases in which wide, even indeterminate, classes of persons 
could be said to have been adversely affected. This would increase the risk 
as well as the premium. The custom of indemnifying undesignated third 
parties as beneficiaries under the policy might be restricted. 
Cooke J answered this type of floodgates liability fear in Gartside v Sheffield, 
Young and Ellis41 by saying he was not "persuaded that we should decide a 
41 (1984] NZLR 37. 
fairly straightforward case against the dictates of justice because of 
foreseeable troubles in more difficult cases."42 
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Nevertheless, it would seem anomalous if a beneficiary under a life insurance 
policy were to rely on the provisions of the Contracts (Privity) Act 1982 but 
not the CGA or vice versa. There would be a degree of incongruity if the 
beneficiary had to rely on the Contracts (Privity) Act and was without a 
remedy in a situation where statutory guarantees are imported into every 
consumer contract for services. 
B The Service Supplier's Duty to Third Parties 
The potential extension of a duty under the CGA to third parties is 
problematic. Where an agency relationship exists, the agent's duties are 
owed to his or her employer, the insured. The agent is not permitted to enter 
into any arrangement which creates a conflict between that duty and either 
his or her own interest or the interest of another person. 
Given that the law seeks to protect the insured against conflicts of interest, it 
would seem to follow that the courts ought not to impose upon an agent a 
duty of care to a third party if the effect of such a duty of care would be to 
dilute the agent's duty to the insured.43 Imposing a duty of care to third parties 
may cause an agent, intermediary or insurer, to act differently towards his or 
her client even where there is no possible conflict of dutieS.44 
42 Above n 41 , 44 . 
43 The principle that there can be a duty of care owed to a third party in respect of pure financial 
loss was confirmed by the House of Lords in Junior Books Ltd v Veitchi Co [1983] AC 520. 
44 See Seale v Perry [1982] VR 193; Gartside v Sheffield, Young & Ellis [1978] 2 NZLR 547. 
C Duty of Care to the Intended Beneficiary under a Policy 
An agent's liability will generally be limited to insureds and to specific 
persons known to be reliant upon the agent's performance of his or her 
duties. 
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The duty does not solely rest on the foundations of contract and can be 
transferred. A duty of care existed where brokers were asked by a purchaser 
of a vehicle to transfer the vehicle's insurance from the vendor to the 
purchaser. 45 In Bromley London Borough Council v E//is46 the third party was 
able to sue the broker for failing to obey the insured's instructions to transfer 
the policy on a car to a third party. Duties could also be owed to the intended 
assignee of the policy.47 
Closer to home, in Gee Bee Limited v Lombard Insurance Company Limited48 
a broker was found to be negligent in his failure to arrange for cover to be 
issued in the name of the new owner. 
Where the agent is required by the insured to procure a policy which covers 
the interests of both him or herself and a third party, the agent owes a duty of 
care to the third party to obey the insured's instructions. 
45 London Borough of Bromley v Ellis (1971 J 1 Lloyd's Rep 97. 
46 (1971] 1 Lloyd's Rep 97. 
47 (1992] 3 All ER 104. However note Verdame v Commercial Union Assurance Co pie 
(1992] BCLC 793 where no action was possible against a broker who advised that company 
property be insured in the names of shareholders and directors and a claim was declined for 
lack of insurable interest. Here the duty was owed to the client company and not the 
shareholders .. While this decision might be perceived as harsh, it is fully consistent with the 
strict doctrine of corporate personality. 
48 Unreported, 15 December 1986, High Court, Christchurch Registry, AS/85 ; endorsed in the 
Court of Appeal (1990] 2 NZLR 1. 
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If the agent is a broker, it may be that the insured has acted as the agent of 
the third party in employing the broker or that the third party is a person who 
will foreseeably suffer harm in the event of negligence, and there is no 
conflict of duties concerned in the imposition of a further duty of care. 
This, and other similar concerns, is illustrated in the analogous context of 
duties owed by a solicitor to the intended beneficiary of his or her client's will. 
D Analogous Duties of Solicitors 
Ordinarily there will be no duty to third parties. 
The solicitor owes no such [paramount] duty to those who are not his clients. 
He is no guardian of their interests. What he does for his client may be hostile 
and injurious to their interests; and sometimes the greater the injuries the 
better he will have served his client.49 
But in cases where a solicitor, and by analogy a supplier of insurance 
services, has acted so as to induce reasonable reliance by a third party a 
duty may be imposed. This will be more so where the agent is approached to 
attend matters that will impact on the future interests of identifiable third 
parties. 
In Ross v Caunters50 damages were awarded to an intended beneficiary 
against a solicitor who, for his negligence in preparing his client's will , 
prevented the gift from taking effect. The analogous situation arises in the 
insurance relationship where the third party is not covered because of the 
negligence of a supplier of insurance services. 
49 Ross v Caunters [1980) Ch 297, 322. 
50 .[1980) Ch 297 
Despite academic support for Ross v Caunters51 , the case must now be 
seriously doubted in light of a recent House of Lords decision. A number of 
conceptual problems were identified by Lords Goff and Mustill in White v 
Jones. 52 
Furthermore, the basis on which Ross v Caunters also seems to have been 
eroded. 
1 The erosion of Ross v Caunters 
In Ross v Caunters Sir Robert Megarry V-C relied on the House of Lords 
decision in Anns v Merton London Borough Council. 53 
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The test in Anns focussed on "whether, as between the alleged wrongdoer 
and the person who has suffered damage there is a sufficient relationship of 
proximity or neighbourhood such that, in the reasonable contemplation of the 
former, carelessness on his part may be likely to cause damage to the 
latter ... "54 
On this approach a prima facie duty of care would arise whenever it should 
reasonably have been contemplated that carelessness might cause damage 
to another. Whenever there was a foreseeability of harm of any kind the 
plaintiff could argue that there arose a prima facies duty of care. 
51 See J L Dwyer "Solicitor's duties in tort to persons other then their clients" (1994) Tort Law 
Review29 
52 [1995) 1 All ER 691 , [1995) 2 WLR 187. 
53 [1978) AC 728. 
54 Above n 53, 751. 
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A tide of criticism mounted in the House of Lords in a succession of cases 
culminating in Murphy v Brentwood District Council. 55 In Murphy the House of 
Lords held that Anns should not be followed. 
Though Ross v Caunters was founded on the now discredited approach in 
Anns, the New Zealand Court of Appeal has relied on it. 
In Allied Finance and Investment v Haddon & Co56 the members of the Court 
analysed the matter of a solicitor's certification in terms of the approach laid 
down by Lord Wilberforce in Anns. Furthermore in Gartside v Sheffield Young 
& Ellis57 the Court of Appeal applied Ross v Caunters notwithstanding the 
decision in Seale v Perry. 58 
The Full Court of the Supreme Court of Victoria in Seale v Perry refused to 
follow Ross v Caunters. Among the reasons for not doing so was that the 
client owed no duty to the beneficiary nor a duty to make the gift or to perfect 
the execution of his intention to make the gift. Why then should the solicitor 
be held subject to a duty of which the client was free? 
Also the content of the solicitor's duties was entirely within the control of the 
client who could change his instructions or waive any breach of instructions. 
This suggested that the solicitor owed no separate duty to the plaintiff. 
Further the concept that a solicitor may owe a duty to a person other than his 
or her client in discharging the client's instructions involves serious difficulties 
such as the possibility of conflicting duties. 
55 [1991] 1 AC 398. 
56 [1983] NZLR 22. 
57 [1983] NZLR 37. 
58 [1982] VR 193. 
LAW LIBRARY 
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In White v Jones59 Lord Goff rejected Ross v Caunters as involving many 
conceptual difficulties. Among these were that liability for a claim for 
damages for pure economic loss could be excluded on the basis of contract. 
Also the claim could be based, as was the case in White v Jones, on a pure 
omission and therefore would not give rise to tortious negligence. On that 
basis it would be open to say that the claim could only lie in contract and was 
therefore not open to a disappointed third party. 
2 White v Jones 
Any doubt over the basis of a professional's duty of care to third parties was 
put to rest in White v Jones. A 3:2 majority imposed a duty of care on a 
solicitor towards third party beneficiaries. 
The majority was led by Lord Goff who submitted that a remedy should 
extend to an intended beneficiary under the Hedley Byrne principle. 60 The 
assumption of responsibility by a solicitor towards his or her client should be 
held to extent to the intended beneficiary who (as the solicitor can reasonably 
foresee) may as a result of the solicitor's negligence, be deprived of his or 
her intended benefit. 
Under the same principle, the House of Lords in Henderson v Merrett 
Syndicates Limitecf1 further held that the assumption of responsibility by a 
person rendering professional or quasi-professional services coupled with a 
concomitant reliance by the person for whom the services were rendered 
59 Above n 52. 
60 Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd [1964] AC 465 
61 [1994] 3 All ER 506. 
could give rise to a tortious duty of care irrespective of whether there was a 
contractual relationship between the parties. 62 
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It may therefore be suggested that an agent, and more especially a broker in 
a professional capacity, as with any professional person, owes a duty of care 
to a person other than his or her client if: 
a] it is foreseeable that the third party is likely to be harmed by any 
negligence on his or her part; and 
b] the imposition of a duty of care does not have any actual or 
potentialimpact upon the duties owed by the professional to his 
or her own client. 
Also, if an insured intends to confer a benefit on a third party, the agent will 
owe a duty of care to the insured and the third party beneficiary in carrying 
out the instructions. 
Given the availability of tortious remedies to beneficiaries and the possible 
extended definition of consumer, third parties ought to able to rely on the 
provisions of the CGA on which to found a further cause of action. 
V GUARANTEE AS TO REASONABLE SKILL AND CARE: SECTION 
28 Given the significance of tasks undertaken by intermediaries (particularly 
sales intermediaries), the often substantial amounts of money at stake and 
the fact that the contract of insurance is one of utmost good faith, it is not 
surprising that a considerable volume of case law has arisen in recent years 
in relation to insurance intermediaries. This will continue to be so since the 
CGA establishes the statutory guarantee as to reasonable skill and care into 
the insurance relationship. 
62 C Boxer "Tort or Contract" 17 February 1995, Solicitors Journal, 136. 
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A Basis of Duty of Care of a Broker as the lnsured's Agent 
There is undoubtedly a contractual relationship between the insured and the 
agent or insurer, so that negligence on the part of the service provider will 
render him or her liable in an action for breach of contract. 
As Phillips J pointed out in Youell v Bland Welch & Co Ltif'3, it has been 
accepted, since before 1964, that an insurance broker owes a duty of care in 
negligence towards his or her client, whether the broker is bound by contract 
or not. Furthermore, in Punjab National Bank v de Boinville64 it was held that a 
duty of care was owed by an insurance broker not only to his client but also 
to a specific person whom he knew was to become an assignee of the policy. 
B Contract or Tort? 
Cases in New Zealand stemming from McLaren Maycroft & Co v Fletcher 
Development Co Ltcf5 required that, in cases where there were concurrent 
duties in contract and tort, the claimant must pursue their remedy in contract 
alone. However, Thomas J in Rowlands v Ca//ow66 held that a person 
performing professional services may be sued for negligence by their client 
either in contract or in tort. 
The issue is now virtually incontestable; a person who has performed 
professional services may be held concurrently in contract and in negligence, 
unless the terms of the contract preclude the tortious liability.67 
63 (The "Superhul/s Cover Case) (No 2) [1990] 2 Lloyd's Rep 431 , 459. 
64 [1992] 3 All ER 104. 
65 [1973] 2 NZLR 100. 
66 [1992] 1 NZLR 178. 
67 Above n 65, 190. 
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In the insurance context Tipping J in the High Court has said "[b]y 
emphasising the contractual relationship between the parties I am not 
suggesting that this is an absolute bar to a duty of care being found to exist in 
tort beyond the scope of the contract. "68 
The existence of a contract between a professional adviser and their client 
was at one time regarded by the English courts as excluding the possibility of 
a tortious duty of care, but it is now the case that contractual or tortious duties 
may exist side by side. 
A recent House of Lords case has resolved the long-standing controversy 
about the co-existence of liabilities in contract and tort . Lord Goff in the 
leading speech in Henderson v Merrett Syndicates Limited said that a 
claimant may be entitled to take advantage of the remedy which is most 
advantageous to him, subject only to ascertaining whether the tortious duty is 
so inconsistent with the applicable contract69 that the parties must be taken to 
have agreed that the tortious remedy is to limited or excluded. 10 
Consequently, in the event of negligence, the insured may choose whether to 
sue in contract or in tort . 71 
It will therefore rarely matter whether the insured's action is contractual or 
tortious. The broker's duty in contract or tort is to maintain the standards 
reasonably to be expected of a competent broker, the measure of damages 
68 Sinclair Horder O'Mal/ey v National Insurance Company of New Zealand Limited (1992] 2 
NZLR 706, 721 . 
69 Under the CGA the service provider would not be able to contract out of their responsibility 
of reasonable skill and care : see section 40. 
10 [1994] 3 All ER 506, 532. 
71 Forshadowing this analysis see Midland Bank Trust Co Ltd v Hett Stubbs & Kemp (1978] 3 
All ER 571 and Forsikringsaktielskapet Vesta v Butcher [1989] 1 All ER 
will be the same, and the defence of contributory negligence is available to 
the broker in both situations. 72 
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Given the long term nature of insurance contracts a question may occur as to 
when the cause of action arises. The better option is therefore to sue in tort 
since an action will be likely to accrue at a later date and will be less likely to 
be defeated by the Limitation Act 1950. 
Matthews Corporation Limited v Edward Lumley & Sons (New Zealand) 
Limited73 concerned the limitation period in relation to insurance services. 
Holland J likened the cause of action for negligence in obtaining an 
insurance policy which appeared on its face to be sound but which was 
unsound because of the financial inadequacy of the insurer, not immediately 
apparent, with that of negligence for defective workmanship which is not 
immediately apparent to see or appreciate. 
C Substance of a Duty of Care 
The CGA is not purported to be an attempt to introduce any change to the 
law of negligence.74 It could therefore be argued that it adds nothing to 
existing law. 
Nevertheless, the Act now places the obligations of service providers on a 
statutory basis and incorporates the tort concepts of reasonable skill and 
care into service contracts. As a result, services must be provided with 
reasonable care and skill. 
72 RM Merkin Insurance Contract Law (Kluwer Publishing , London, 1991) 0 .2.3-49 
73 Unreported , 4 November 1994, High Court, Christchurch Registry, CP247/92 .. 
74 Report of the Department of Justice on the Consumer Guarantees Bill (1992) Part II cited in 
above n 36, 29. 
But given that an objective standard is required, what is the requisite 
standard of care and skill? How are the duties of reasonable skill and care 
translated into the insurance relationship? 
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An insurance broker is under a general duty to exercise reasonable care and 
skill in the performance of his or her obligations. 75 The test whether a broker 
is in breach of the duty of care is whether they have failed to measure up in 
any respect to the standard of the ordinary person exercising that profession. 
In advising the client who employs him, the professional man owes a 
duty to exercise that standard of skill and care appropriate to his 
professional status and will be liable both in contract and in tort for all 
losses which his client may suffer by reason of any breach of that 
duty.76 
Where a person possessed of a special skill chooses, irrespective of any 
contractual or fiduciary duty, to give information or advice in circumstances in 
which he knows or ought reasonably to know that his or her skill or judgment 
is being relied on , he or she is under a duty to exercise reasonable care in 
giving that information or advice. 77 
The duty can be a continuing duty of care. 78 This being the case, the potential 
liability under the CGA is not extinguished once the business is placed, the 
premium paid and the policy document issued. 
75 Above n 14, 9-820. 
76 Caparo Industries pie v Dickman [1990] 2 WLR 358, 366. 
77 Above n 60. 
78 Lewis v Tressider Andrews Associates Ply Ltd (1986) 4 ANZ Insurance Cases 60-750, 
74,524. 
The potential for liability exists throughout the contract since the advice 
tendered could prove to be unreasonable even after a claim is made under 
the policy. The duty continues where the agent arranges renewals and co-
ordinates premium payment and is covered more specifically in respect of 
independent agents in the Insurance Intermediaries Act 1994. 
1 Clients Instructions 
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An agent's duty is, first and foremost, to follow his or her client's instructions 
clearly and the broker must therefore exercise proper care and skill in 
attempting to carry them out. 79 An agent must exercise proper care and skill 
in attempting to carry out a clients instructions. 
The intermediary's responsibility to duly carry out the insured's instruction fits 
comfortably within the wording of section 28 in that the instructions must be 
carried out with reasonable skill and care. 
Responsibility could also attach under section 29 if the intermediary does not 
understand the client's instructions an therefore fails to carry them out. This 
would be the case where the service has failed to achieve a particular result 
that the insured has made known. 80 
Normally an agent is instructed to arrange insurance and they should make 
reasonable inquiries as to the client's needs. It is therefore important to 
determine what those instructions are. If the instructions are ambiguous, an 
agent may not be liable if his or her interpretation of the instructions is 
reasonable in all the circumstances. 
79 Fanhaven Pfy Ltd v Bain Dawes Northern Pfy Ltd (1982) 2 ANZ Insurance Cases 60-480. 
Also Eagle Star Insurance Co Ltd v National Westminster Finance Australia Ltd (1985) 3 ANZ 
Insurance Cases 60-634 at 78,905 
80 This will be considered below. 
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In the case of a broker, he or she is instructed to arrange insurance and 
should make reasonable inquiries as to his or her client's needs.81 If there are 
no specific instructions, a broker should obtain insurance suitable to his or 
her client's needs. 
If the broker cannot obtain appropriate insurance and thus carry out their 
client's instructions they should inform the client. Failure to do so deprives 
the client of the opportunity of making other arrangements and constitutes a 
breach of the duty of care. 82 A broker acts negligently if he or she does not 
act reasonably or within a reasonable time. 
Evidence was accepted by the Court in Parkinson v National Insurance Co of 
New Zealand Lta63 that the practice was that insurance cover should be 
arranged immediately. 
The broker called on the Parkinsons on 9 February to check their insurance 
coverage on a new workshop and vehicles and undertook to advise them on 
their insurance needs. 
The broker informed National Insurance to arrange the requisite new and 
increased coverage on the morning of 14 February, but fire has destroyed 
much of the workshop and vehicles the day before. 
National Insurance succeeded in denying liability. The Parkinson's however 
successfully claimed against the broker for breach of the broker's contract 
with them in failing to place new insurance cover and effect the amendments 
to the existing cover before the loss. 
81 This may also fit with in the section 29 guarantee discussed below. 
82 Above n 14, 9-927. 
83 (1991) 6 ANZ Insurance Cases 61 -072. 
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The Parkinsons also succeeded against the broker in negligence. The broker 
owed the Parkinsons a duty of care and was in breach of the duty when he 
failed to carry out promptly, and within a reasonable time, the instructions of 
the Parkinsons as to the insurances. 
2 Insolvent Insurer 
A broker should also advise his or her client of any difficulties, for example in 
relation to the solvency of the insurer, that may arise during the period of the 
insurance, so that the client can make alternative arrangements if 
necessary.84 Brokers have been held liable in damages for recommending 
their client insure with a company known to be in financial difficulties. 85 
An insurance broker may be liable if insurance is placed with an underwriter 
who is subsequently unable to meet a claim. The purpose of the service is to 
obtain insurance cover for the consumer. Failure to do so is, prima facie, in 
breach of the guarantee as to fitness for purpose.86 If the broker failed to 
make reasonable inquiries into the stability of the underwriter he or she would 
not be able to point to the default of the underwriter to block redress under 
the Act. 81 
84 Above n 78. 
85 Beck Helicopters Limited v Edward Lumley & Sons (New Zealand) Limited Hillyer J 
Auckland High Court 268/85. An example of this arose in the Matthews Corporation Limited v 
Edward Lumley & Sons (New Zealand) Limited Unreported , 7 December 1992, High Court, 
Christchurch Registry, and Unreported , 4 November 1992, High Court, Christchurch Registry, 
CP247/92. Overseas examples include Osman v J Ralph Moss Ltd [1970) 1 Lloyd's Rep 313; 
Zisopoulos v Barry Johnston (Insurance brokers) Pfy Ltd (1982) 2 ANZ Insurance Cases 60-
641. 
86 But see s36(a) of the CGA: No redress in relation to failure due only to a third party fault. 
However the broker is likely to be acting as the underwriters agent with respect to the consumer 
and will therefore have a right of indemnity. 
87 Section 36 of the CGA. 
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3 Marketing 
While figures are not available, experience indicates that the majority of 
consumer policies are marketed by direct solicitation and that the sales staff 
of insurers, whether they are counter attendants or active canvassers are not 
trained in the nuances of insurance law, nor are they expert in interpreting 
the terms of their company's policies.88 Many agents are simply trained in the 
art of selling and many insureds continue to discover after a loss that the 
representations made to them art the time of the contract as to the extent of 
cover under their policies was inaccurate. 
Inaccurate representations can fall under the section 28 guarantee of a duty 
of reasonable skill and care. It is also possible that representations will fall 
within the section 29 guarantee as to fitness for a particular purpose. 
(a) Negligent Mis-statement 
The reasoning that a solicitor may be liable in a Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v 
Heller & Partners Ltc/'39 action to persons who act in reliance on his or her 
statements or advice whether they are clients or third parties is particularly 
appropriate in the insurance context. 
Where an insurance agent gave incorrect advice as to the cover under a 
policy he was held liable in damages.90 Because a client does not need to 
supervise the agent , the client is entitled to rely upon the agent checking the 
terms of the insurance. 
88 B Kercher and R Thomas "The Reform of Insurance Law: Caveat Emptor Survives" (1987) 
10 UNSWLJ 173, 183. 
89 Above n 60 .. 
90 Elliott v Ron Dawson & Associates (1972) Ltd (1982) 139 DLR (3d) 323. 
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Recently the New Zealand Court of Appeal relied on Hedley Byrne. In 
Medical Assurance Society of NZ Ltd v Lovie. 91 The prospective insureds 
discussed insurance for converting two properties to a single home with the 
insurer's branch manager. 92 Existing cover was held with NZI but the insured 
wanted a "contractors all risks policy" to cover the work being carried out. 
The branch manager was told all the material facts and led the insureds to 
believe that he was covered. 
The High Court had found tortious liability on the basis that the insurer was 
vicariously in breach of a duty it owed to the insureds. A prudent insurer 
should have ensured either that NZI was prepared to continue to hold the 
existing building insured while the client held the contractors all risks 
insurance, or that they should have arranged to cancel the NZI insurance and 
take over all the risks involved.93 
Also, if the insurer would not issue a cover note immediately, the branch 
manager should have explained the urgency of the situation and ensured all 
steps were taken to obtain cover immediately. 
The High Court found that the branch manager had led his clients to believe 
that cover had taken effect immediately and that there was no urgency, The 
High Court found that there was a "special relationship" between the insurer 
and the insureds in terms of Hedley Byrne and that the insureds had relied on 
the branch manager to give them cover. 
91 Unreported , 31 March 1993, Court of Appeal , CA255/92. 
92 The Court of Appeal views the branch manager's position as analogous to that of an 
insurance agent or broker in advising the insureds. 
93 The surprising width of this proposition was subsequently narrowed in the Court of Appeal. 
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The Court of Appeal clarified and narrowed the duty to the particular facts of 
the case. The Court of Appeal found that an insurer did not have a general 
duty to inform the insured on matters arising from policies with another 
insurer, Generally, the relationship between an insurer and its client should 
be governed by the contract between them. However, there was no reason 
why an insurer could not accept such a duty in certain circumstances, either 
in response to a request or by making a representation which it knew would 
be relied on. The Medical Assurance Society of NZ Ltd had been the 
insured's insurer for nearly 30 years. They had a "special relationship" with 
the client gave rise to a duty of care. 
(b) Misrepresentation 
Misrepresentation can not only breaches the guarantee that the service will 
be carried out with reasonable skill and care but it breaches a fundamental 
part of the Fair Trading Act 1986. 94 The FTA contains a number of provisions 
on which an insured may rely in relation to misrepresentation by an insurer or 
intermediary concerning the effect of a contract or a failure by an insurer to 
provide him or her with adequate information at the time of entry into the 
contract. 95 
Section 9 of the FT A provides that: 
No person shall , in trade, engage in conduct that is misleading 
or deceptive or is likely to mislead or deceive. 
94 Hereinafter "FT A" . 
95 See A Everett, "Fair Trading Legislation and Insurance" (1990) 3 Insurance Law Journal 1. 
The test under this section is objective, 96 and a capacity to mislead or 
deceive is all that is needed; no-one actually need be misled or deceived. 
There need not be an intention to mislead, and even silence may constitute 
misleading conduct when the circumstances give rise to an obligation to 
disclose relevant facts. 
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In Warnock v ANZ Banking Group Ltcl37 the insured had obtained a personal 
loan from his bank. The manager had also sold him an insurance policy to 
cover payments in the event of illness or accident. The premiums were to be 
part of the loan. Mr Warnock had to make a declaration concerning his 
health. He told the manager he had received medical treatment for 
rheumatoid arthritis. The manager said it was not relevant to the terms of the 
policy. The policy contained specific exclusion for (inter alia) disablement as 
a result of illness which existed at the commencement of the insurance. Two 
months later Mr Warnock suffered a severe arthritis condition which 
precluded him or her from further work. he claimed under the policy and was 
refused. 
The Court upheld his claim against the Bank for misleading and deceptive 
conduct under the TPA98 and for breaching the statutory warranty as to skill 
and care.99 It was held that the bank manager had misled Mr Warnock, had 
given him no opportunity to read the insurance documents and did not draw 
attention to the exclusion clause. 
96 Mills v United Building Society [1988] 2 NZLR 392, 413; Savi// v NZ/ Finance Ltd [1990] 3 
NZLR 135, 146 per Hardie Boys J . 
97 (1989) ANZ Insurance cases 60,897 
98 Section 52. 
99 Section 74 implies a warranty of due skill and care into a contract for services. 
Given an appropriate set of facts an insured might have a stronger claim 
under the FTA than the CGA. Certainly section 9 of the FTA covers a wider 
area of conduct than any single concept in the general law. It applies to 
misrepresentation and misdescription in contract. In tort it can provide an 
alternative cause of action in cases of deceit or negligent mis-statement. 
Further, the FTA is administered and enforced by the Commerce 
Commission. Actions are brought by the Commerce Commission and 
therefore insured do not have to be concerned about the problems of 
protracted legal costs. 
5 Proposals and Premiums 
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If the agent undertakes to complete the proposal or to advise the client on its 
completion , he or she is required to exhibit reasonable care and skill in doing 
so.100 Dicta exists to suggest that an insured has a duty to take reasonable 
steps to see that no untrue statements were put before the insurer.101 
However, the harshness of such decisions has been amel iorated by more 
recent judgments which place the onus on the intermediary as agent for the 
insurer. 102 
Statutory protection also exists to protect an insured who has made 
disclosure to an intermediary but has been advised not to record th is on the 
proposal. 
Such statutory assistance for the insured has existed in New Zealand for 
nearly 20 years in the form of section 10(2) of the Insurance Law Reform Act 
1977. This deems the insurer to have had notice of all matters material to a 
100 Claude R Ogden & Co v Reliance Fire Sprinkler Co Pty Ltd (1973) 2 NSWLR 7. 
,o, Jumna Khan v Bankers and Traders Insurance Co Ltd (1926) 37 CLR 451 . 
102 Deaves v CML Fire & General Insurance Co Ltd (1979) 23 ALR 539. 
contract of insurance known to a representative of the insurer (being any 
servant or employee of the insurer and any person entitled to receive 
commission from the insurer) concerned in the negotiation of the contract 
before the proposal is accepted by the insurer. 
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An agent may be under a duty to advise his or her client of any exclusions or 
limitations in the insurance cover he or she arranges for his or her client. 
Cases may also arise where an agent, particularly an independent agent or 
broker, should inform his or her client of the broad requirements of insurance 
law and point out legal pitfalls. 103 
In Fanhaven Pty Ltd v Bain Dawes Northern Pty Ltd the exercise of 
reasonable care did not require the broker to inform an insured of the 
obligation to disclose material matters other than those to which questions in 
the proposal referred . However where a proposal does not incorporate a 
general question inviting the disclosure of any material facts, it is incumbent 
upon a broker to advise a client that the questions posed are not exhaustive 
and that there may be material facts outside the listed questions that ought to 
be disclosed. 
6 Claims 
In addition there might be a duty of care in settling claims. 
The main obligation on an insurer is to satisfy within a reasonable time a 
claim that falls within the scope of the policy. The obligation to pay the claim 
within a reasonable period of time is implied as a matter of course in any 
103 Fanhaven Pty Ltd v Bain Dawes Northern Pty Ltd (1982) 2 ANZ insurance Cases 60-480 
77,721 . 
contract. It is clearly imposed by the duty of utmost good faith 104 as well as 
within the duty of reasonable care and skill. An insured could sue for loss 
involved in an improperly conducted claim settlement. 
Loss Adjusters have been sued for improperly assessing the extent of an 
insured's loss. lnsureds will also be able to claim for protracted claim 
settlement, bad faith claim settlement and for consequential loss. 
E Contributory Negligence 
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According to section 4 of the CGA, the Act is not a code. The rights and 
remedies under the CGA are in addition to any other right or remedy and is 
does not repeal, invalidate or supersede any other Act. 105 A consequence is 
that consumers might lose the right to a remedy under the CGA if their 
negligence has contributed to their own loss. 
At common law a defendant in a negligence suit who was able to 
demonstrate that the plaintiff had been guilty of negligence which contributed 
to the loss, had an absolute defence. This principle was modified by the 
Contributory Negligence Act 1947, which introduced the possibility of 
apportionment. 
Apportionment meant that the Court could make a declaration for damages 
with an allowance being made for the plaintiffs negligence. 
Under the Contributory Negligence Act "fault" means negligence, breach of 
statutory duty or other act or omission which gives rise to a liability in tort or 
would, apart from the Contributory Negligence Act. 
104 DStL Kelly and ML Ball Principles of Insurance Law in New Zealand and Australia 
(Butterworths,Sydney, 1991)466. 
105 Section 4. 
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Under section 3 where any person suffers damage as the result partly of his 
or her own fault and partly of the fault of any other person or persons, a claim 
in respect of that damage shall not be defeated by reason of the fault of the 
person suffering the damage. The Court's justice and equity jurisdiction 
determines the damages recoverable. 
Where the insured sues the service provider in tort, the Contributory 
Negligence Act 1947 is potentially applicable. A difficulty might arise where 
the insured's action is framed in contract. It has to be determined whether 
apportionment is available in a purely contractual action. It is clearly logical 
that the defence should operate and such a result would be consistent with 
the general attempt of the judiciary to eliminate as far as possible differences 
between contractual and tortious actions based on the same facts. 
However, the problems with this approach are, first, that contributory 
negligence appears not to have been a defence in contract at common law 
and, secondly, that the precise problem of overlapping contractual and 
tortious liabilities did not emerge until after the passing of the Contributory 
Negligence Act 1947 and thus was not dealt with by it. 106 
The initial view of the English courts to the English equivalent of New 
Zealand's Contributory Negligence Act was that the Act had no application 
when the action is framed in contract. The Supreme Court of Australia in 
Claude R Ogden & Pfy Ltd v Reliance Fire Sprinkler Co Pfy Ltd1°7 was of the 
view that an action in contract against an insurance broker who had allegedly 
failed to pass on material facts to the insurer was not subject to a defence 
based on contributory negligence. 
106 Above n 74. 
107 Above n 100. 
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The English Court of Appeal has held that where the defendant's liability in 
contract is the same as his or her liability in the tort of negligence, 
independently of the existence of any contract, apportionment may be made 
under the English equivalent of the Contributory Negligence Act 1947. While 
the establishment of the defendant's liability in tort is a prerequisite to 
apportionment, the fact that he or she is not sued in tort is immaterial. If 
tortious liability can be established, apportionment may be made whether the 
plaintiffs action is framed in contract or tort.108 
Similar sentiments were raised in the House of Lords in Henderson v Merrett 
Syndicates Limited.109 Subject to the terms of the contract excluding tortious 
liability110, the plaintiff can now choose the most advantageous cause of 
action on which to base their suit. 
In New Zealand Pritchard J in Rowe v Turner Hopkins & Partners111 in the 
High Court held that the Contributory Negligence Act 1947 did provide for 
apportionment for an action in contract, as long as the defendant's liabi lity 
also sounded in tort. In the Court of Appeal Cooke and Roper JJ said that the 
Contributory Negligence Act 1947 "can apply wherever negl igence is an 
essential ingredient of the plaintiffs cause of action, whatever the source of 
the duty."112 (emphasis added) 
It could be argued that this is authority for the proposition that the 
Contributory Negligence Act 1947 may be pleaded in an action for contract 
108 Forsikringsaktie/skapet Vesta v Butcher [1989] 1 All ER 
109 Above n 61. 
110 Note tortious liability for negligence cannot be contracted out of undr the CGA: see 
section 40. 
111 [1980) 2 NZLR 550. 
112 [1982] 1 NZLR 178, 181 . 
and under the CGA. If this view found widespread judicial favour the 
Contributory Negligence Act could considerably erode the effectiveness of 
the guarantees under the CGA. 
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But, while apportionment may well be available, there is almost no authority 
as to how judicial discretion is to exercised. English cases decided before the 
passing of the Contributory Negligence Act 1947, when contributory 
negligence was an absolute defence to the plaintiffs action, show an 
understandable reluctance to admit that a negligent broker could ever defeat 
the plaintiff by demonstrating that the plaintiff was partly responsible for his or 
her own loss. 
In Dickson v Oevitt113 Atkin J, faced with the argument that that policy issued 
to the insured was inadequate for his or her needs was as much the insured's 
own fault as that of the broker, had no hesitation in rejecting it. 
Business could not be carried on if, when a person has been employed 
to use care and skill with regard to a matter, the employer is bound to 
use his or her own care and skill to see whether the person employed has 
.done what he was employed to do. 114 
The spirit and vitality of this statement continues in the consumer context 
notwithstanding contributory negligence legislation. This is illustrated by The 
Moonacre115 where the court refused to make any deduction from the 
113 (1916) 21 Comm Cas 291 . 
11 4 Dickson v Devitt (1916) 21 Comm Cas 291 , 294. Similarly see British Citizens Assurance 
Co v Woodland & Co (1921) 8 LI LR 89 per Bailhache J and the English Court of Appeal in 
General Accident Fire and Life Assurance Corporation Ltd v Minet & Co Ltd (1942) 7 4 LI LR 1 . 
However also see O'Connor v Kirby [1972] 1 QB 90 where the English Court of Appeal held that 
the insured , by failing to check the broker's answers on the proposal form , was the proximate 
cause of his own loss. 
115 Above n 83. 
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insured's damages against the broker in respect of the insured's failure to 
read the policy after it had been sent to him or her and in thus failing to 
appreciate that the insured yacht was not covered while it was being used as 
a houseboat. 
In Parkinson v National Insurance Co of New Zealand Ltd116 the broker 
undertook the onerous burden of establishing on the balance of probabilities 
that the plaintiffs failed to use reasonable care to see that their own property 
was properly protected by up-to-date and adequate insurance. In rejecting 
the defence of contributory negligence Penlington J found the insureds were 
under no obligation to check on the broker's conduct following the giving of 
their instructions. 
It may therefore be suggested that the Contributory Negligence Act 1947 will 
pose no great obstacle to insured's relying on the CGA to enforce 
guarantees. 
VI GUARANTEE AS TO FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE: 
SECTION 29 
A Overview 
The guarantee under section 29 has generated a great deal of comment within the 
insurance industry. Indeed risk management strategies are being recommended by 
industry bodies such as the Life Office Association of New Zealand. 
The fear is that this guarantee might amount to a guarantee as to the result of 
the service. Guaranteeing the result would be an onerous obligation, 
particularly in respect of life insurance savings products. This means that if a 
consumer tells an insurer a desired purpose or result, the service provider 
must either 
116 (1991) 6 ANZ Insurance Cases 61 -072 
a) deliver a service that is reasonably capable of achieving that 
purpose or result or 
b) make it clear that the particular purpose or result cannot be 
achieved or that the insurer cannot guarantee that it will be 
achieved.117 
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Any attempt to contract out of this will attract liability under section 40. For 
this reason the Life Offices Association recommends that customers broad 
needs and purposes are identified and recorded for future reference at the 
point of sale. 118 This obviates any evidential difficulty in finding out what the 
particular purpose or expected result was that the consumer made known 
when the policy was taken out. Disclosure by the service provider of the likely 
results might be an important factor in the circumstances indicating the 
absence or unreasonableness of reliance. 119 
8 The Guarantee 
The section 29 guarantee requires that the service be reasonably fit for any 
particular purpose and of such a nature and quality that it can be expected to 
achieve any particular result that the consumer makes known to the supplier 
before or at the time of making the contract. The guarantee does not apply 
where the circumstances show that the consumer does not rely on the 
supplier's skill or judgment or where it is unreasonable for the consumer to 
rely on the supplier's skill or judgment. 
117 V Owen "The Consumer Guarantees Act 1993: How does it apply to the sale of Life 
insurance?" The Insurance Journal September 1994, 33, 35. 
118 Noting a broad purpose is obviously preferable from an insurer's point of view since a 
narrowly stated purpose or result might be more difficult to achieve. 
119 Above n 31, 33. 
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Section 29 places an obligation on the service provider to supply to the 
consumer a contract of insurance that must be reasonably fit for the purpose 
for which it was supplied. This is a dramatic departure from the common law 
which states that service providers will use reasonable skill and care. At 
common law there is no implied guarantee that the service will achieve the 
desired result. 120 
The section is worded differently from section 8 which relates to goods. 
Unlike section 8, there is no qualification that the consumer must have made 
known to the supplier the particular purpose expressly or by implication. 
Secondly, there is a requirement that the purpose be made known before or 
at the time of the contract, which is absent from section 8. 
Likewise, the Australian Trade Practices Act 197 4 deals with this question in 
respect of the provision of consumer goods. Section 66(2) of the Australian 
Trade Practices Act explicitly establishes the buyer's reasonable 
expectations as a base standard. 
Goods of any kind are of merchantable quality ... if they are as fit for 
the purpose or purposes for which goods of that kind are commonly 
bought as it is reasonable to expect having regard to any description 
applied to them, the price ( if relevant) and all the other relevant 
circumstances. 
Can this reasonable expectation be imported into section 29? 
120 Greaves & Co (Contractors) Ltdv Baynham Meikle & Partners (1975) 3 All ER 99, 103-104 
cited by A Fraser ''The Liability of Service Providers Under The Consumer Guarantees Act 1993" 
[1994] 16 NZULR 23, 31 . 
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C Reasonable Expectations 
Where a consumer desires and purchases insurance cover for their home 
contents policy, the policy must provide that coverage. The extent to which 
the particular policy achieves the insured's desired purpose will be a central 
issue under the s29 guarantee. But from who's perspective should the 
reasonableness as to fitness for purpose is determined? 
Section 29 of the CGA contains subjective elements in that fitness for 
purpose will be judged on the particular purpose for which the service is 
required or the desired result of the consumer, made known to supplier at the 
time of contracting. 
However, objective elements might be imported. 
1 United States precedent 
United States courts have developed a doctrine specifically for consumer 
insured's protection to redress the power imbalance perceived as inherent in 
insurance contracts and purportedly caused by standard term contracts.121 
The doctrine of reasonable expectations of the insured requires the court to 
enforce an insurance contract in accordance with the level of coverage an 
average insured would reasonably expect. 
A literal application of the doctrine would suggest the focus of the judicial 
inquiry is in what the particular insured actually expected and whether the 
particular expectation was reasonable. US courts have instead questioned 
whether any insured might reasonably have expected coverage 
121 See M Naulls "Compliance with Section 29 of the Consumer Guarantees Act 1993: Can the 
American Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations Help?" LLB(Hons) Research Paper, Victoria 
University of Wellington , 1994. 
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The objective requirement in the reasonable expectations principle is a policy 
consideration but it is also suggested by the requirement that an expectation 
be reasonable before it will be honoured. That rider limits the obvious over-
reaching that would result if any insured were able to demand their particular 
expectations be met. 
2 Consumer-oriented interpretation 
It has already been discussed above how the advent of consumer oriented 
legislation, such as the CGA might, affect the interpretation of insurance 
contracts. It might be that the relevant criterion of construction of the contract 
will be that of "the understanding of the reasonable person in this country [at 
the time of making the initial contract]".122 
This is because policies are offered to ordinary working people who are 
unlikely to have the advantage of the advice of a commercial lawyer when 
they purchase protection from an insurance company.123 " ... the trend is, if 
anything, to adopt a liberal interpretation in favour of the assured, so far as 
the ordinary and natural meaning of the words used by the insurers permits 
this to be done. "124 
3 Statutory interpretation 
Fraser argues that the term "particular purpose" is incorporated into the CGA 
from section 16(a) of the Sale of Goods Act 1908.125 This term has acquired a 
special meaning and was not limited to a special purpose. It includes 
122 Groves v AMP [1990] 2 NZLR 408, 415 per Hardies Boys J . 
123 Australian Casualty Co Ltdv Federico (1986) 66 ALR 99, 106. 
m Per Cooke J in Mount Albert City Council v New Zealand Municipalities Co-operative 
Insurance Co Ltd [1983] NZLR 190 quoting Halsbury's Laws of England (4 ed, Butterfworths, 
London, 1980) vol 25 Insurance, para 594. 
125 Above n36, 35. 
"normal", "general" or "common" purposes. She continues that the normal 
purpose of the goods supplied can easily be implied from the facts. 
Therefore, the normal purpose can also be implied into a service. For 
purpose for engaging an insurer or a broker, it is assumed that the services 
are required to effect cover. 
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Fraser goes on to suggest that it is necessary to imply into section 29 a 
requirement that services be fit for their common purpose. Further , when a 
consumer requests performance of a service and says nothing about any 
particular purpose, the request should suffice to "make known" that the 
service is being acquired for its common purpose. The insured who, again, 
asks for home contents insurance ought not to have to recite all possible 
contingencies that he or she expects to be covered, not to itemise all possible 
items that they expect to be covered. 
If a home contents policy commonly covers jewellery but the pol icy taken out 
only covers jewellery to a specified value , the insured may nevertheless be 
able to claim. 
A further example might be where the insured makes known to the insurer 
that they require insurance for a specified peril. Restrictions and limitations 
could be incorporated into the pol icy document which lessen the cover 
required . 
4 New Zealand Precedent 
An insight into how section 29 might apply can be gleaned from the case of 
Ker v Anthony Ryan & Co Ltd. 126 
126 (1989) 5 ANZ Insurance Cases 75,998. 
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The owners of a racing car obta ined damages in the High Court from an 
insurance broker as compensat ion for an uninsured loss caused to spare 
parts for the car.127 Gallen J held that the insured had sought cover for parts 
and if the broker did not understand this, it was part of his obligation, holding 
himself out as an insurance expert, to ascertain the extent of the cover 
required and desirable. 
It might be argued on the basis of Gallen J's reason ing that fitness for 
purpose ought to judged from the insured's perspective. The intermediaries 
understanding of the insured's requirements was not the focus of the Court's 
inquiry. In respect of the clienUintermediary re lationship, the point must be 
made that the intermediary must thoroughly verse themselves in the clients 
needs to be sure of discharging their responsibilities under the CGA. 
VII CONTRACTING OUT: SECTION 40 
Aside from the guarantees, the major feature that gives the CGA cred ibili ty is 
that, in a consumer transaction , service suppl iers cannot contract out of their 
obligations. 
The starting point at common law for the duty of care between a principa l and 
their agent is the contract. The contract may express ly specify what the agent 
is employed to do and the standard of care to be observed. The contract may 
also expressly extend or limit the agent's liability for breach of duty. 
Provisions in a contract which limit or exclude liability are strict ly construed 
but if such a provision is so "crystal clear" and incapable of any other 
interpretation then one relieving the party in breach of duty of liability, then it 
127 If the case was to rely on a CGA there would be obvious difficulties in that arranging 
insurance for racing cars and their spare parts does not fall with in the definition of a service 
ordinarily acquired for "personal , domestic or household use or consumption". 
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will operate to do just that. 128 
This position changes dramatically under the CGA which prohibits contracting 
out of the Act's provisions except in a business relationship. Providers of 
insurance services cannot contract out of their duty of reasonable skill and 
care as well as the other guarantees. 
If an insured agrees that a savings-linked insurance policy may decrease in 
value as well as increasing, the insured cannot be bound if by such 
agreement if the decrease was attributable to the service providers 
negligence. Additionally, by such a mere cautionary statement, a provider of 
insurance services might be construed as attempting to contract out of the 
CGA's provisions. 
There may be an arguable case that the insurer constructively contracts out 
in certain cases. It could also be argued that attempts to exclude coverage 
contained in the policy but not brought to the lnsured's attention might be 
construed as an attempt to limit the effect of the coverage. Exclusions and 
restrictions written into the policy document but which the insured may not 
realise are incorporated into the proposal may lessen the coverage the 
insured expects. Attempts to restrict coverage commonly expected might be 
construed as attempting to contract out of the guarantee under section 29. 
The insured may have agreed that the policy is of acceptable quality when in 
actuality it is not. The insurer would not be able to rely on the policy wording 
if the insured has made known a desired purpose and the policy does not 
actually satisfy that purpose. 
Insurance policies commonly recite that 
128 Photo Production Ltd v Securicor Transport Ltd [1980] AC 827; [1980] 1 All ER 556. 
The Insured shall take all reasonable precautions to prevent loss 
or damage to any property insured hereunder. 129 
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The commercial purposes of insurance would be frustrated if the insurer were 
permitted to avoid liability against the consequences of the insured's 
negligence which the insurance was intended to provide.130 Arguably this is 
an attempt to contract out of the guarantee as to fitness for purpose. 
VIII REMEDY ISSUES 
A Common Law 
Common law remedies governing service contracts only allow for cancellation 
and/or damages. No opportunity was given to, nor obligation imposed on, a 
supplier of services to make good any defect in those services. 
At common law, the amount recoverable by the insured depends on the 
nature of the brokers breach of duty and the loss that has caused to the 
insured. The most common situation is where the insured has been left 
without a claim. An example , as mentioned above, is where the pol icy was 
not procured or was insufficient to cover the loss. 
The insured's loss is measured by the sum that they would have been able to 
claim under the policy, coupled with any costs that they may have incurred in 
pursuing unsuccessfully the insurer. 
When the broker has failed to obtain any cover at all , the insured has the 
option to seek damages representing the coverage of a notional policy or to 
129 Above n 48. 
130 Above n 48, 103,334. 
seek restitution of any premium paid to the broker on the ground of total 
failure of consideration .. Interestingly in the event of a small loss or a large 
commercial risk demanding a hefty premium, restitution may well provide a 
superior benefit to the insured.131 
B Section 32 
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Section 32 provides options to consumers where services do not comply with 
guarantees. The consumer may require the supplier to remedy the failure.132 
If the service provider fails to do so the failure can be remedied elsewhere 
and costs recovered or the contract can be cancelled.133 
Where the failure cannot be remedied, the contract can be cancelled 134 or 
compensatory damages for the reduction in value of the product of the 
service below the charge paid by consumer.135 
Reasonably foreseeable consequential damages are also available for failure 
of any guarantee. 136 
The remedies provided by the CGA may not operate practically in insurance 
law. Returning to the service provider once cover has been denied or is found 
to be insufficient will not remedy any failure. The insured will want to recover 
the lost expectation of coverage. 
131 Above n 74, D2.3-51 . 
132 Section 32(a)(i) . 
133 Section 32(a)(ii)(A) and (B) . 
1
3-4 Section 32(b)(i) 
135 Section 32(b)(ii) 
136 Section 32(c) 
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Further, while it might be easy to identify when a more appropriate and better 
insurance service might be had elsewhere before a claim, the inadequacy of 
the service coming to light after a loss could be catastrophic. 
Cancellation of a contract and refund of premium is not in itself problematic. 
However, in the event of a claim by an insured where a guarantee has failed, 
the ideal remedy would be the payment of the claim. 
In Warnock v ANZ Banking Group Ltcf 37 relief was in the nature of a payment 
equivalent to the cover Mr Warnock would have obtained had the manager 
correctly represented the terms of cover to him. 
Likewise in Medical Assurance Society of NZ Ltd v Lovie 138 damages were 
assessed as the agreed cost of reinstatement along with consequential 
losses and general damages. The collapse of the building project was 
reasonably foreseeable by the insurer as a likely consequence of denying 
insurance cover, 
These two cases can be compared to Gates v City Mutual Life Assurance 
Society Limitecf 39. Misrepresentations as to the desirability of insurance cover 
led to an award of damages limited to the amount of the premium being 
refunded and an order varying or rescinding the insurance policy. 
It may be argued that there is a better remedy under Contractual Remedies 
Act 1979 , the Fair Trading Act or at common law for damages for deceit if 
there has been a misrepresentation. Potentially, the burden of proof under 
the FTA is easier for a complainant insured to prove than under the CGA. 
137 Above n 97. 
138 Above n 91 . 
139 (1983) 68 FLR 101 
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Under the CGA there is always the danger that expert evidence as to what is 
reasonable may contain a subjective taint. 
IX CONCLUSION 
lnsureds' confidence in the CGA will ultimately depend on the ability to 
enforce the Act with respect to insurance matters. 
One the one hand, the CGA does not create an independent body to enforce 
the statutory guarantees on behalf of consumers. It is not like the Fair 
Trading Act 1986 for example, which gives the Commerce Commission fairly 
wide powers to act upon a complaint. 140 Nor does it create civil or criminal 
liability for breaches of the guarantees. What the CGA does do is empower 
consumers to pursue their statutory rights through the courts or the Disputes 
Tribunal. 
Nevertheless, a number of industry bodies now exist in an effort to regulate 
the insurance services. As mentioned above, the Insurance Council of New 
Zealand, Life Offices Association and Insurance and Investment Advisers 
Association have all recently formulated codes of conduct and business 
practice. This is in addition to the Insurance and Savings Ombudsman 
Scheme. 
It may be that the CGA will provide parameters within which these bodies 
operate to protect insureds. While using the Act as a sole cause of action 
140 Nevertheless, a body such as exists under the Australian Trade Practices Act 197 4 will be 
no guarantee of better enforcement. Kercher and Thomas above n 88, 192 describe the TPA as 
brilliantly conceived in its combination of specific and general prohibitions and of public and private 
enforcement. However the Trade Practices Commission has never had suffiient resources to fulfil 
its public enforcement obligations. 
may be limiting, it will nevertheless form the basis on by which service 
providers behave . 
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The CGA by itself is unlikely to have a significant direct impact on insurance 
law. Nevertheless, in conjunction with existing common law and statutory 
mechanisms as well as industry codes the Act may well add another sword to 
the armoury of the consumer insured. 
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